Introduction
The linked issues of immigration and the emergence of multicultural societies, especially in many of the largest cities of the so-called developed world, have come to public prominence in recent years, in part (in large part in many cases) driven by populist political parties and media outlets. Thus, for example, the Front National in France has argued against that country's rapidly changing cultural composition-as more recently, among others, have the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany and the Partij voor de Vreiheid in the Netherlands. The United Kingdom Independence Party has argued strongly for controls on the number of immigrants, and that argument was central to the successful case made by it and members of several other political parties that the UK should leave the European Union. Although that case for 'Brexit' attracted support across most sectors of British society, it was particularly successful at winning over large numbers within what has become termed the 'anxious class', 1 those-especially the relatively old economic difficulties, negative assessments of the political system, and positive evaluations of the leader, Pauline Hanson (Denemark and Bowler 2002; Gibson, McAllister, and Swenson 2002) . Mughan, Bean, and McAllister (2003) stressed the importance of job insecurity as an underpinning factor influencing support for One Nation's wider populist programmes. As globalisation has increased inequalities and threatened economic security among certain groups within society, so they have been attracted to politicians and parties that have not only attacked neo-liberal policies with which multiculturalism has been associated but also condemned the political elites who have promoted such policies. Those statistical studies accompanied an outpouring of analysis from both academics and media commentators following One Nation's entry onto the Australian political scene. Some of these highlighted wider relationships between 'Hansonism' and multiculturalism, between immigration and 'Australianness' or national identity. Ahluwalia and McCarthy (1998, 80) , for example, referred to a 1996 speech by Graeme Campbell, independent MP for Kalgoorlie in Western Australia, which highlighted ' … multiculturalism and immigration. The two are intertwined … [a] multicultural industry [which] is committed to maintaining ethnic diversity at the expense of mainstream Australia', and an Australian identity based on 'the predominantly Judeo-Christian, Anglo-Celtic settlement of [Australia] and the legal and constitutional links with England'. Hanson's (1996, 3802-5) maiden speech in Parliament echoed Campbell's remarks:
… for far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate … I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished … we are in danger of being swamped by Asians … They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate.
Focusing on national identity, Ahluwalia and McCarthy (1998, 81) Leach (2000, 53) characterised Hansonism as a revolt which had quickly '[d]escended into the old Anglo-Australian bedrock of competitive racism, exposing in the process an older "xenophobic white settler" notion of community'. Ang and Stratton (1998, 36) concluded that it was very difficult to argue against this position:
The pluralist discourse of 'cultural diversity', which emphasises the harmonious co-existence of ethnic groups, is simply not capable of countering the divisive and conflict-ridden imaginary produced by discourses of racial tension. Ang (2003, 51) saw in Pauline Hanson's rhetoric a sense of insecurity, of an 'anxious nation', a 'cultural anxiety' representing 'a historical continuity in Australian attitudes' and a 'sharp reminder that the structures of feeling of White Australia have not disappeared in a time of Aboriginal reconciliation and multiculturalism'. Stokes (2000, 23) characterised Hansonism as 'conservative populism', distinguishing between 'the people' ('I do believe that I am the voice of mainstream Australia '-Hanson, cited in Smith 1996) and the 'other' from both above and below (Stokes 2000, 26-29 The chance to stand against those who have betrayed our country and would destroy our identity by forcing upon us the culture of others … if we fail … we will lose our country forever and become strangers in our own land.
One Nation and the 2016 federal election Multiculturalism has failed everywhere. It is negative and divisive, a weight that is drowning our once safe and cohesive society … As a government policy, multiculturalism encompassed measures to destroy the Australian culture. It played a large part in migrant selection in an attempt to prevent them from assimilating into Australian society …
We would replace it with a policy of assimilation in which it will be made clear to all those applying to migrate to Australia that coming to Australia is a privilege that gives them an overriding, unifying commitment to Australia, to its past, current interests and future first and foremost.
They must accept the basic structures and principles of Australian heritage, society and culture, the constitution and the rule of law, tolerance and equality, parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, and English as the national language. Whilst they may come from other countries and cultures, loyalty to Australia and Australian Nationalism must come first.
The implications regarding inter-cultural relations in contemporary Australia-and the inferred descriptions of divisions within society, especially with regard to Muslims-are profound. One Nation's claims suggest that of the three types of integration identified by Miller (2016, 132ff.) , there is little social integration (regular inter-group, inter-personal interaction across a range of social contexts), a questionable amount of civic integration (sharing 'principles and norms that guide their social and political life' (133)), and very little cultural integration (having a common cultural identity). Where is the evidence for such claims? For more than a century, social scientists-largely following the lead set in the USA (initially in Chicago)-have associated the lack of social and cultural integration with residential segregation in cities: different groups live their social and cultural lives apart from each other, even though they may have considerable contact in their workplaces and other spheres. Critics of multiculturalism tend to characterise the areas where minority groups congregate as exacerbating 'them-and-us' divisions within society: the minority groups interact socially only with their neighbours, sustaining their cultural identities and generating tensions between themselves and the 'unknown others' (of the society's majority) who live elsewhere. Pauline Hanson illustrated this in 1996 with her claim that Asians in Australia 'have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate', and One Nation's statement of aims on its website in 2016 claimed that 'all Australians … should work toward unification, not segregation, under the one law for all'.
9 Pauline Hanson was reported in the Sydney Morning Herald days after the 4 July 2016 federal election as repeating her 1996 claim that 'Australians fear that their suburbs have been "swamped by Asians"':
… You go and ask a lot of people in Sydney, at Hurstville or some of the other suburbs. They feel they have been swamped by Asians … You ask people in Melbourne about how they feel about it as well.
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In response, a subsequent article argued that 'Failing to expose her lies will mean that for some they become facts '. 11 So what are the 'facts'? Some of the claims involve perceptions but basic statistical data can be used to explore the extent and intensity of segregation. Are there substantial tracts of Australian cities (ghettos even?) where Asians and other minorities-Muslims, for example (on their spatial separatism-or lack of it-see Dunn and Hopkins 2016 12 )-are concentrated and dominate the local population? There has been much empirical research into the intensity of residential segregation of ethnic populations over the last century, with comparative studies showing that segregation, especially of African-Americans, was generally more intensive in American than other comparable cities (see Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest 2007) . Ghettos, as defined in the American context, are rare in other countries: ethnic groups are segregated to some extent in Australian cities, as illustrated by recent work on Sydney (Johnston, Forrest et al. 2016 , Johnston et al. 2017 , but is that patterning within the urban fabric consistent with Pauline Hanson's claims regarding ghettoisation and 'swamping'? To address that question, and evaluate the factual basis for the 'moral panic' those claims both reflect and potentially foment, the following section provides basic descriptive data on the residential distributions of Asians and Muslims in Australia's main urban areas.
The geography of ethnic and religious minorities in Australia
We used data from the 2011 census Tablebuilder facility (https://www.censusdata.abs.gov. au/webapi/jsf/dataCatalogueExplorer.xhtml) for the eight Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSAs), and the Statistical Areas, Level 4 (SA4s) for Newcastle and Geelong; Wollongong comprised the Illawarra SA4 (Table 1) . Their populations ranged from 106 257 (Darwin) to 4 028 525 (Sydney), and are where the majority of the Asian and Muslim populations have settled. Two variables were analysed: the percentage of the population in each sub-area who claimed Asian (including partAsian) ancestry; 13 and the percentage who responded that their religious affiliation was to Islam.
The summary data for the urban areas in Table 1 suggest a clear distinction between Australia's two largest metropolitan areas-Melbourne and Sydney-and the smaller places. More than one-in-five Sydney residents and just over one-in-six Melbourne residents claimed Asian ancestry. The capital cities of the other three mainland states also had relatively large Asian components to their populations, although the largest outwith Melbourne and Sydney was for the federal capital, Canberra. Three non-capital city urban areas (Geelong, Wollongong and Newcastle), along with Hobart, had less than 5 per cent of their populations claiming Asian ancestry but Darwin had three times that many. For Muslims, the percentages were much smaller, with only Sydney (just) exceeding 5 per cent of its population identifying themselves with Islam and seven of the eleven places having less than 2 per cent (Table 1) .
Each urban place has been divided into four hierarchically nested sets of sub-areas, at increasing spatial scales, from which we have excluded those with fewer than 20 residents and those encompassing special areas (such as an airport or an industrial area):
. Neighbourhoods (SA1 areas in the Australian Bureau of Statistics terminology), of which there were 33 337 with a mean population of 423 (standard deviation (SD): 164); nested within . Suburbs (SSC areas), of which there were 2728 with a mean population of 5175 (SD: 5634); nested within . Districts (SA2 areas), of which there were 1166 with a mean population of 12 108 (SD: 6702); nested within . Regions (SA3 areas), of which there were 186 with a mean population of 75 900 (SD: 42 782)
The two key variables were separately calculated for each areal unit at each scale of the classification. Asian and Muslim overall concentrations Regarding the geography of Asians in Australia's major urban centres, whatever the scale of the analysis, in half of the areas they form less than around 10 per cent of the local population, and less than around 5 per cent in one-quarter of the areas (the median value at the regional scale is 10.1 per cent and the first quartile is 5.1). Thus across half of the subdivisions within the country's 11 urban areas examined here, Asians form at most only a small minority of the population. There are, however, areas where they are a much larger proportion of the total. At the smallest scale, for example, in 10 per cent of all neighbourhoods the Asian percentage exceeds one-third of the total (i.e. the ninth decile is 33.3 per cent); that share is slightly smaller at the larger scales, but still exceeds 25 per cent. Over metropolitan and major urban Australia as a whole, therefore, Asians form at least one-quarter of the population in 10 per cent of the subdivisions-not only of the small neighbourhoods but also the much larger regions. Alongside these areas with substantial Asian populations there is a further considerable proportion of the cities' neighbourhoods, suburbs, districts and regions (40 per cent of them between the median and the ninth decile) where they form between 10 and (at least) 25 per cent of the local population.
The overall picture provided by data in the left-hand part of Table 2 therefore shows an urban fabric divided into: substantial proportions of their areas with few Asians; considerable tracts where they form a not-insignificant proportion of the local population (less than one-quarter of the total but more than one-tenth, and thus undoubtedly visible in the landscape); and a minority of areas (one-tenth of the total) where they form a much larger segment of the total. That is a very different situation from the geography of Muslims, shown in the righthand block of data in Table 2 . These not only form a much smaller proportion of metropolitan and major urban Australia's total population but are almost entirely absent from many of its component parts. The median percentage at any of the four scales does not exceed 1.2, and the upper quartile 3.2, indicating that there are very few Muslims in most parts of the cities. There are some areas where they apparently dominate-the largest percentage for a neighbourhood is 79.7 (Lakemba-Wiley Park, in Sydney) and for a suburb (Lakemba) is 51.7-but such situations are rare. They form more than 70 per cent of the population in only five neighbourhoods (four of them in Sydney and one in Melbourne), for example, and there are 82 neighbourhoods (out of 33 337-0.002 per cent) where they form more than half.
Very high levels of concentration of Asians and Muslims: a focus on Sydney and Melbourne
How does this picture vary across urban Australia? Table 3 shows the number of subdivisions at each level of the classification where Asians and Muslims form more than 50 and 70 per cent of the local population, for each urban area. (Because they have none at any scale forming more than 70 per cent, eight of the eleven urban areas are excluded from the second block.)
One pattern stands out clearly in these data: areas where Asians and Muslims form a majority of the population are concentrated overwhelmingly in just two citiesMelbourne and Sydney. Indeed, in none of the other nine places is there even a single neighbourhood where Muslims form a majority of the population, let alone more than 70 per cent, and three of them (Newcastle, Geelong and Darwin) have no neighbourhoods where Asians form a majority of the local population. (Over one-in-seven of Darwin's population claimed Asian ancestry, but they are clearly widely distributed throughout its townscape.) Figures 1-4 map the distributions of those concentrations of Asians and Muslims in Sydney and Melbourne at the neighbourhood scale, using the classification according to their percentages of the local total discussed below. In both cities Asians are mainly found in inner-to-middle neighbourhoods, virtually surrounding the inner city areas with some outer suburban outliers (to the west and south-west in both cases; Figures 1 and 2) ; in Sydney they are largely absent from the higher status suburbs on both shores of the outer harbour, and in Melbourne there are few of them along the eastern shoreline of Port Phillip Bay. In both places the smaller numbers of Muslims are spatially more concentrated, though with small proportions of the total widely distributed through the cities' suburbs. In Sydney the main concentration is to the south-west of the city centre in and around Lakemba (Figure 3) , where the city's main Sunni mosque is located; Melbourne has three separate clusters (Figure 4 )-neighbourhoods to the north, north-west, and the south-east (the last close to Monash University).
In Sydney, which has the largest Asian population relative to its size, some 738 of its 9529 neighbourhoods (7.7 per cent) have an Asian majority: they contain 25.7 per cent of Greater Sydney's total Asian population. Greater Melbourne has fewer Asian-majority neighbourhoods, containing 12.1 per cent of its Asian population. The nine other places have 586 558 Asian residents in total, but Asian-majority neighbourhoods contain only 4.2 per cent of them: outwith Melbourne and Sydney, very few Asians live in neighbourhoods where they dominate the population.
At the larger spatial scales, only Sydney has more than a handful of suburbs with an Asian majority; 25 of them together contain 19.7 per cent of Sydney's total Asian population (one of them-Hurstville, identified by Pauline Hanson as a suburb 'swamped by Asians'-has 62.5 per cent of its population claiming Asian ancestry), and nine districts contain 13.3 per cent of the built-up area's Asians. Such relatively intense concentrations are even rarer elsewhere; Melbourne has four districts with Asian majorities (containing only 6.1 per cent of its total Asian population).
Sydney and Melbourne also have the largest Muslim populations, but few of them are concentrated in areas-even at the smallest spatial scale of the neighbourhood-where they form more than half of the local population. The 57 such neighbourhoods in Sydney contain only 7.1 per cent of all Muslims there, and the 25 in Melbourne contain just 4.5 per cent. And if the focus is on neighbourhoods where they predominate in the local population, only 0.07 per cent of Sydney's Muslims live in neighbourhoods where they form more than 70 per cent of the population, and 0.02 per cent of Melbourne's. Only one suburb in those two cities-Lakemba in south-west Sydney-has more than half of its population Muslim. (Lakemba has been categorised as 'Australia's unofficial Muslim capital '; 14 its Muslim population is predominantly Lebanese.) Even where there are strong concentrations of this minority religious group, they tend to be localised in particular small neighbourhoods; there are no extensive areas in Greater Sydney-let alone anywhere else in Australia-where Muslims form the majority.
In conclusion
Populist political parties-such as Pauline Hanson's One Nation-promote their causes by creating what Bauman (2016, 2) terms moral panics, namely fears of 'some evil [that] threatens the well-being of society'. Multiculturalism as a result of mass migration is presented as creating such fears because the immigrants-or at least many of them-are 'strangers … [who] tend to cause anxiety because of being strange-and so, fearsomely unpredictable, unlike the people with whom we interact daily and from whom we believe we know what to expect' (Bauman 2016, 8) . For some-whom Bauman identifies as 'mixophiles'-the presence of strangers in their midst is a positive aspect of city life, but that is not the case for the 'mixophobes'. The latter, he argues, tend to be concentrated among those who 'lack the capacity to cut themselves off from the … all too often unfriendly, distrustful and hostile urban environments, to whose hidden dangers they are doomed to remain exposed for life ' (10-11) . Those fears are stoked up into 'xenophobia, racism and the chauvinistic variety of nationalism' (13) and the presence of 'strangers' is presented as 'embodiments of the collapse of order' (15), providing 'highly fertile and nourishing meadows tempting many a political vote-gatherer to graze on them'-an opportunity that 'a growing number of politicians would be loath to miss': such politicians capitalise on 'the anxiety caused by the influx of strangers-who, it is feared, will push down further the wages and salaries that already refuse to grow … ' (17).
It may be that Australia, like other societies, is becoming what Amin (2012) has termed a 'land of strangers' because even where there is cultural mixing within neighbourhoods and suburbs nevertheless 'Today, people live next to each other largely as strangers' because there is little social contact between neighbours. One of its consequences, Amin argues (2010, 55) , is that neighbours will tend to embrace … an art of self-protection mutual avoidance, skirting around trouble. … The danger in this is to court isolationist or punitive ways of living with difference. It turns neighbourhoods into zones of discipline and surveillance. It makes us wary of the Muslim, the beggar, the welfare scrounger, the dissident, the immigrant, the one who doesn't fit in. The logical extension of this culture is that the neighbourhood ceases to be a place of peaceful coexistence among strangers and becomes instead one of fear and suspicion of the other.
That fear and suspicion resulting from neighbourhood segregation provides the foundation for moral panic.
Such moral panic associated with residential segregation is a characteristic feature of many contemporary political parties in a wide range of countries (see, for example, Oesch 2008; Rydgren 2013) . In part the panic is exacerbated through spatialisation of the growing presence of strangers: not only are those strangers characterised as 'swamping' societies and introducing alien cultural traits that threaten established ways-of-living through their numerical presence but by congregating in particular areas-notably neighbourhoods and suburbs within cities-they distance themselves from their 'host societies' and create tensions between 'them-and-us' based on relative ignorance through noncontact. The moral panics fomented by Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party are clear examples of those processes: Australia, it claims, is being swamped by alien culturesAsian and Muslim-and they are taking over large tracts of its urban landscape, creating separate cultural territories which others-those whose votes are courted by the populist political parties-view with fear and suspicion (cf. Uslaner 2012) .
But is that the case? Are Australia's main urban areas split territorially into segregated zones where different groups live apart from each other (cf. Poulsen, Johnston, and Forrest 2004) ? The descriptive analyses of Australian census data reported here have shown that with regard to Muslims:
. they form only a small percentage of the populations of the country's 11 largest built-up areas; and . within those 11 places there are very few small neighbourhoods where they form more than 5 per cent of the local population, and extremely few where they are in a majority locally-with all of those neighbourhoods being in Sydney and Melbourne.
Muslims are widely scattered through Australia's urban fabric, therefore. Whether their presence is a threat to 'our democracy and way of life', as One Nation claims, cannot easily be associated with their concentration in particular areas where such a threat can be stimulated for lack, save in a tiny number of cases, of such contextual stimulation. Commentaries on terrorist outrages in other countries have associated their very high levels of concentration in particular areas-parts of Birmingham, England, being portrayed as 'totally Muslim, where non-Muslims just simply don't go in' and as ghettos that are police 'no-go areas', for example, 15 and the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek being the breeding ground for 'battle-hardened militants' 16 -with the conditions in which jihadists are radicalised. Indeed, one British report showed that 10 per cent of all UK offenders found guilty of jihadist terrorist offences were from five wards in Birmingham and onequarter lived in neighbourhoods where Muslims comprised at least 60 per cent of the population.
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Australian cities contain many more Asians than Muslims, and there are significant territorial concentrations of them, notably in parts of Sydney and Melbourne. Even so, the great majority of Asians there-75 per cent in Sydney and 88 per cent in Melbournelive in neighbourhoods where they form only a minority of the local population. Indeed, over one-third of Sydney's Asians live in neighbourhoods where they form less than one-quarter of the population, and over 8 per cent of them are in neighbourhoods where they form less than one-tenth. Outside Melbourne and Sydney, over 30 per cent of all Asians in those nine urban areas live in neighbourhoods where they form less than 10 per cent of the population and nearly three-quarters of them in neighbourhoods where they form less than 25 per cent. Across urban Australia as a whole-and indeed across much of Melbourne and Sydney-they are scattered rather than segregated.
Areas where Asians dominate-let alone predominate in-neighbourhood populations are not the norm, therefore. There are significant concentrations-mainly of Chinese-in some parts of Melbourne and Sydney but there are few parts of even those places where it can be claimed that Asians have 'swamped' the local population. As has been shown elsewhere, the 'moral panics' that populist-nationalist parties stimulate with regard to minority group residential segregation into claimed 'ghettos' can be over-stated when checked against official data (see, for example, Johnston, Manley, and Jones 2016). 18 And that is certainly the case in Australia. Most Asians there-even in Sydney and Melbourne where they are concentrated-do not live apart from the general population: they live among them, and Muslims are widely distributed through the country's urban fabric. The size and composition of Australia's ethnic minority populations, and the increasingly multicultural society that is emerging, may be a cause for concern with regard to the extent of their social, cultural and civic integration, but associating such concern with the geography of where they live is quite misleading.
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